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I study the consequences of heterogeneity of skills for the design of an optimal unemployment 
insurance, using a principal-agent set-up with a risk neutral insurer and infinitely lived risk 
averse agents. Agents, who are characterised by different productivities or skills, are 
employed by firms offering wages that depend both on the agents’ individual skill level and 
the quality of the worker-firm-match. Agents face the risk of losing their job and, while 
unemployed, are offered jobs with different match qualities. No search effort by the agent is 
needed to receive offers. Individual productivity declines during unemployment due to 
depreciation of skills and increases on the job because of learning by doing. 
Any insurance offered must take into account the moral hazard problem created by the fact 
that job offers are private information to the agent. A further complication is due to the 
unobservability of an agent’s productivity. 
I find that under an optimal contract, periods of unemployment are characterised by declining 
benefits. Agents are further punished for long unemployment by reducing expected future 
utility. A new result obtained from this approach is the observation that under an efficient 
contract, agents whose productivity is relatively high tend to have a shorter unemployment 
duration and a higher productivity growth in the future. Unemployment benefits do not only 
depend on an agent’s employment history, but also on the skills reported by the agent. Agents 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a great deal of interest in efficient unemployment insurance in the literature. It 
is a well-established empirical finding that generous unemployment insurance schemes tend 
to raise the unemployment rate in an economy. High unemployment benefits and long benefit 
durations increase the attractiveness of being unemployed. In popular theoretical models, they 
make workers or unions push for higher wages or reduce the job-search efforts exerted by the 
unemployed. A good survey of the major developments in the unemployment insurance 
literature is given in Holmlund (1998). 
The model presented here follows a strand of literature that interprets insurance schemes as 
the solution to principal agent problems. 
Shavell and Weiss (1979) were the first to show that if unemployed agents can influence the 
probability of finding a job, an optimal unemployment insurance pays declining benefits. 
However, they make the simplifying assumption that once individuals find a job, they are 
employed forever. The decline of benefits in periods when agents can perform hidden actions 
seems to be a typical feature of efficient social insurance contracts. Thomas and Worrall 
(1990) also obtain this result for a model in which the moral hazard problem stems from the 
fact that the agents’ period income is unobservable. They prove that as a consequence, 
expected discounted utility converges to its infimum with probability one. In the light of this 
result, Atkeson and Lucas (1993) impose a lower bound on lifetime utility in any period and 
show that under this additional assumption, efficient insurance leads to a stable cross-
sectional distribution that is not fully concentrated at the lower bound. Using a similar 
constraint on admissible utility levels, Pavoni (2003a) finds that the resulting optimal 
insurance contract is similar to unemployment insurance schemes actually implemented. 
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) explicitly model moral hazard as an unobservable search 
effort exerted by unemployed agents. They find that incentives to search efficiently should not 
only be created by decreasing benefits during unemployment, but also by levying higher 
social security taxes on agents who have been unemployed for a long time. This mechanism 
to spread the punishment for low search effort over time is required because agents are risk 
averse. Using a calibrated version of their model, the authors also show that moving towards 
this efficient mechanism might result in considerable welfare improvements.  
The declining benefits result has recently been challenged on various grounds. Wang and 
Williamson (1996) consider a model in which both search effort and job retention effort are 
required. They show that under such a set-up, optimal unemployment benefits first rise before   3
declining monotonously. Allowing for unobserved saving by the agents, Werning (2002) 
shows that an optimal unemployment insurance derived under this additional assumption need 
not exhibit declining benefits during a spell. 
Another approach to the analysis of efficient unemployment insurance arrangements is to 
embed a labour market with frictions in a general equilibrium model. Although such models 
are often too complicated to derive an optimal solution to the insurance problem, they have 
the virtue of allowing the researcher to compare different policies in a more realistic set-up. 
Typically, calibrated versions of such models are used to find constrained optima of 
unemployment insurance mechanisms and to assess welfare effects of alternative policies. 
Frederiksson and Holmlund (1999) construct a model of job search abstracting from capital. 
They consider an unemployment insurance with two benefit levels and show that optimality 
requires the benefits to decline. In a calibrated version of their model they find significant 
welfare gains from switching from an optimal one-level to a two level benefit unemployment 
insurance. 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) construct a general equilibrium model with search in which 
highly productive jobs are also riskier. They show analytically that under these circumstances, 
if agents are risk averse, maximal output is attained only with an unemployment insurance. 
Hansen and İmrohoroğlu (1992) study the consequences of moral hazard for optimal 
replacement ratios in an economy populated by liquidity constrained agents. They find that an 
optimal insurance has a relatively high benefit level to protect agents from large fluctuations 
of consumption. However, if moral hazard is introduced, replacement ratios at levels observed 
in reality may actually make the economy worse off than without any insurance at all.  
Using a matching model, Costain (1999) only finds minor improvements of consumption 
smoothing with unemployment insurance. Also, the importance of moral hazard is relatively 
small. In the model of precautionary savings discussed in Engen and Gruber (1995), 
unemployment insurance creates large crowding out effects. Using American micro-data, the 
authors estimate that an increase of the replacement rate by ten percentage points may reduce 
asset holdings by more than five percent. 
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the consequences of variable individual skill levels for the 
design of an optimal unemployment insurance. If agents are characterised by different 
productivities that increase during employment and decline while an agent is unemployed, an 
insurer is faced with at least two new considerations. First, if individual skills are 
unobservable, a mechanism to differentiate between agents of different productivities might be desirable. Second, an insurer may want to create stronger incentives to work for more 
productive agents, as they can contribute more to total potential output. 
A first attempt to capture these effects in a principal-agent model has been made by Pavoni 
(2003b). He chooses a model similar to that of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), in which 
agents begin their lives unemployed, have to exert an effort to find employment, and, once 
they have found a job, they keep it forever. Pavoni’s main finding is that after a certain finite 
time, an agent’s productivity has declined so much that it is not efficient any more to make 
him engage in costly search. Instead, he receives an “assistance” level benefit from this point 
on. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model economy and the moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems that any insurer is faced with. In section 3, the first 
best outcome is derived and compared to a simple insurance contract solving the moral hazard 
problem. Section 4 discusses a mechanism that solves both the moral hazard and the adverse 
selection problem. After deriving the dynamic structure of the resulting insurance contract, 
some distributional issues are briefly discussed. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
The economy 
Consider an economy populated by a large number of infinitely lived agents. There are also 
employers (firms), whose only purpose is to offer jobs to agents, paying a wage according to 
the agents’ individual productivity and the quality of the worker-firm-match. Finally, there 
may be an insurer (e.g. a government agency or some other monopolist “moneylender”), who 
can offer social insurance contracts to agents. The risk neutral insurer is assumed to have 
exactly the information publicly available. 














where   is a discount factor,   is the period utility function, and   is the mathematical 
expectation, conditional on all information available in period t.   depends on the 
employment status in the current period and can only take on two values,   when employed 
and   otherwise. Thus, denote by   and   the period utility 





e u( c ) u ( c , ) ≡ A
u
u u( c ) u ( c , ) ≡ Awhen (un)employed. Both   and   are assumed to be increasing in consumption, strictly 
concave, and continuously differentiable. Further, for any level of consumption, both utility 
and marginal utility of consumption increase in leisure, i.e. 
e u u u
 
   and  eu u (c) u (c) ≤ eu u (c) u (c) ′ ′ ≤  (c 0 ) ∀ ≥ . (2) 
 
I further assume that the lowest possible period utility, which may me infinitely low, is the 
same whether or not an agent is employed. 
 
  eu inf u inf u : u = =  (3) 
  
Individuals are further characterised by their skill level   that determines their 
productivity during employment. In period 0, this “human capital stock” is known to have the 
cross-sectional distribution  , but individual skills are private information. Skill levels are 
subject to change over time. While employed, agents enjoy an increase of   by the factor 
 per period. This can be thought of as the result of learning by doing, on the job training, 
or the change to a different job that better fits to the agent’s skill profile. During 





u δ . Immediately after being fired,   




All agents begin their lives without a job in period 0. While unemployed, they may receive 
job offers, which differ in their match quality m  drawn from a distribution with cdf. 
 and density g( . Whether an agent receives an offer cannot be observed by an 
insurer. Jobs with a higher match quality are more attractive to the agent, because they pay 
higher wages  . The probability of being offered a job during a period is p. I assume 
that   and q are known only to the agent and his potential employer. Thus, although the 
actual wage paid on a job is observable, employment only reveals limited information about 





Since both   and   are constant, there is no need for an unemployed agent to exert a search 
effort. He only has to sit and wait for the right job – one with an acceptable match quality – to 
G p
                                                 
1 A similar notion of skill levels has been introduced by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1997) and Pissarides (1992) to 
assess the consequences of changes of skills during unemployment on level and persistence of unemployment. 
  5come along. From an insurer’s perspective, a moral hazard problem arises because agents can 
decline job offers without the insurer knowing about it.
2
Once an agent has accepted a job, he stays employed until he is fired, which happens at the 
exogenous rate λ per period. 
There exists a capital market paying the constant risk-free interest rate  . The assumption 
 simplifies the analysis of the insurance problem and ensures the existence of an 
interior solution. The parameters of the model are assumed to be such that the expected 







All agents have access to the capital market. If they do not participate in any insurance 
scheme, they can protect themselves against the fluctuations of labour income by borrowing 
and saving. However, since any debt must be repaid with probability one, if the marginal 
utility of  consumption tends to infinity as   approaches zero, individuals will choose never to 
borrow against uncertain future income. The reason is that agents who have a positive 
probability having difficulties repaying their debt are facing inefficiently high marginal 
utilities.
c
3 The assumption that all agents are equipped with the same small level of wealth 
in period 0 ensures that it is possible to maintain a positive level of consumption under all 
circumstances. Denote by 
0 a 
v(q) the expected lifetime utility of an uninsured agent whose 
initial skill level is  . This is the minimum level of well-being that any insurance contract 
must offer him to be acceptable. It is clear from the structure of the problem that this outside 
option is increasing in  . 
q
q
An unemployment insurance contract constitutes a relationship between the insurer as a risk-
neutral principal and a risk-averse agent. The principal also has the same discount factor 
1 R
−  
as the agents. Without loss of generality, I assume that all insurance contracts are offered at 
date 0. By this time, no information about the actual productivity of individuals has been 
revealed, so all that is known about it is its cross-sectional probability distribution. I further 
assume that contracts directly rule the consumption of the agents. This simplifies notation as it 
abstracts from flows such as wages, contributions and benefits. It is restrictive only insofar, as 
                                                 
2 The same assumption is made by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2002) in their discussion of optimal benefit plans with 
hidden savings. 
3 This is only true, of course, if Ponzi games are ruled out, which I hereby do. 
  6it does not allow to treat such flows asymmetrically, which would be necessary if, for 
example, unobserved savings or interactions between agents were allowed for. 
Two complications can prevent the optimal contract offered by the principal from being fully 
efficient. First, since little is known about the productivity of an agent at time  , the 
principal faces an adverse selection problem if he wants to discriminate between different 
skill levels. Second, due to the fact that agents can decline job offers without the principal 
knowing about it, contracts must provide incentives to accept “the right” jobs, i.e. solve a 
hidden action problem. 
t0 =
In reality, unemployment insurance is usually provided by the state on a non-profit basis. An 
efficient insurance scheme of this kind maximises some weighted average of the agents’ 
expected lifetime utility subject to a zero profit constraint. The weight attached to a certain 
period 0 skill level is arbitrary, however. Also, when first initiated, any social security 
program in democracies must be approved by a majority of the population. This requires that 
at least fifty percent (or more in the case of a qualified majority) of the agents at least expect a 
lifetime utility at the level of their outside option. 
Before I come to this more complex problem, I discuss the first best outcome and a contract 
that only addresses the moral hazard problem in the next section. 
3. Moral hazard 
The first best outcome 
The first best contract is derived by ignoring any asymmetric information, i.e. assuming that 
the insurer as the principal knows everything about the agent and can observe all his actions. 
An efficient allocation can then be determined by finding the insurance contract that 
maximises the principal’s profit for a certain level of lifetime utility guaranteed to the agent. 
Here and in what follows, a recursive formulation of the problem will be used to characterise 
the insurance contracts. Denote by   the highest attainable expected profit to be 
made on a contract promising the agent an expected lifetime utility of  , if the agent’s current 
skill level is q, his employment situation is s
P(q,m,v,s)
v
{employed,unemployed} ∈  and the match 
quality of his current job is m (m  during unemployment). As common in the literature,   
is used as a state variable. Each period, the promise keeping constraint 
0 = v
 
  tt tt vu ( c , )E v t 1 + = +β A  (PK) 
 
  7must hold, meaning that an agent is provided with his promised discounted lifetime utility 
by giving him some current utility   and promising him a “continuation utility” 
t v 
tt u(c , ) A tt 1 Ev+  
for the future. 
A Pareto efficient insurance mechanism is obtained by maximising the principal’s profit 
subject to the requirement that he guarantee to the agent some promised level of lifetime 
utility  . To simplify notation, let  v e P (q,m,v) P(q,m,v,employed) ≡  and 
 be the value of the contract to the principal when the agent 
is employed or unemployed, respectively. The controls of the dynamic programming problem 
are the agent’s current consumption, continuation utility, and for unemployed agents a rule 
determining whether to accept or reject a job. 
u P (q,v) P(q,0,v,unemployed) ≡
 
Assume for the moment that the continuation utility given to the agent upon accepting a job is 
independent of the match quality of this job. This will result as a special case from the 
analysis in section 4. 
To justify the formulation of the problem used below, it is further necessary to prove a rather 
obvious property of the optimal acceptance rule. 
Lemma 1: There is no loss in generality restricting attention to rules that require an agent to 
accept a job if and only if its match quality lies above a threshold level m. 
Proof: Let M  describe an optimal acceptance rule for some skill level and promised 
utility: 
+ ⊂ \
  job with match quality   must be accepted  m mM ⇔ ∈  
Define   by 
* M
 
* M[ m , =∞ )  and  , 
* M M
1dG(m) 1dG(m) = ∫∫
i.e.   is the interval with upper bound infinity that has the same probability mass as  . By 
construction,  . Now replace M  by   in the optimal contract. 
As   with probability one, this does not require any further specification. Neither 
changes the probability of finding a job, nor is incentive compatibility affected in any way in 
the moral hazard case. The only thing that changes is the expected revenue from an accepted 
job, which cannot be lower than under the original contract. Therefore,   is optimal. 
* M M
* E[m | m M ] E[m | m M] ∈≥ ∈
* M




The Bellman equations for the principal’s profit are then 
  8 
  9
e e e +
   (4)  ee ee u
1
ee e c, v , v
ue f e u
P( q ,m ,v ) m a x{ q m c R [ ( 1 ) P( q ( 1 ) ,m ,v )
P (q(1 )(1 ),v )]}
− =− + − λ + δ
λ+ δ − δ







uu c, v , v , m
eu u e
m
P( q , v ) m a x {c R [ ( 1 p ( 1 G ( m ) ) ) P( q ( 1 ) , v )
     p P (q(1 ),m,v )dG(m)]}
−
∞
=− + − − − δ
−δ ∫
u u u +
 (5) 
                           u u uu ue s.t. v=u (c ) [(1 p(1 G(m)))v p(1 G(m))v ] +β− − + − . (PKu) 
 
In what follows, the profit functions Pe and Pu are assumed to be continuously differentiable. 
The following Lemma states a few properties of these functions. Note that the proof does not 
rely on the symmetric information assumption made in this subsection. Thus, these results 
also apply to the profit functions used to analyse the moral hazard contract. 
Lemma 2: For any given q>0 and any m 
i. Pe and Pu are bounded above  
ii. Pe and Pu are decreasing and concave in v 
Proof: With q and m fixed, let P(v) stand for Pe(q,m,v) or Pu(q,v). 
i.  As consumption cannot be negative, the principal’s profit cannot exceed the maximum 
present value of wages, which is finite by assumption.  
ii.  For any levels of continuation utility v1<v2,  1 vv ( 1) v 2 = α+− α , the principal can at 
least earn a profit of  1 P(v) P(v ) (1 )P(v ) =α + −α 2  by offering the agent a lottery of 
value v between v1 and v2. This proves concavity. 
For 
1
min vv ( 1 ) u
− == − β , the consumption that must be delivered to the agent reduces 
to zero. By (3), the agent is indifferent between working and not working in this case, 
so even under asymmetric information about job offers, any acceptance rule can be 
implemented. Thus,   is the result of an unconstrained maximisation of the 
present value of wages, and for any   it follows that  . With the 
concavity of P, it follows that this function must be decreasing in v. 
min P(v )
min vv > min P(v) P(v ) ≤
□  
The first order conditions of the maximisation problem are 
 
[ce]  ee 1u ( c ) 0 ′ − −µ =  (6) 





R ( 1) P ( q ( 1 ) , m , v ) ( 1)
v
− ∂
−λ +δ −µβ −λ =
∂
0  (8) 
[veu] 
1
ue f e u
eu
RP ( q ( 1 ) ( 1 ) , v )
v
− ∂
λ+ δ − δ − µ β
∂





R( 1p ( 1G ( m ) ) ) P ( q ( 1 ) , v) ( 1p ( 1G ( m ) ) ) 0
v
− ∂











−δ −νβ − =
∂ ∫  (11) 
[m] 
1
u u uu e u ue uu ue R pg(m)[P (q(1 ),v ) P (q(1 ),m,v )] pg(m)[v v ] 0
− −δ − −δ −νβ − = , (12) 
 
where   and   are the Lagrange multipliers attached to the promise keeping constraints 
(PK
µ ν
e) and (PKu), respectively. The envelope conditions with respect to   become:  v
 













Proposition 1: The first best allocation has the following properties: 
i.  The marginal utility of consumption is always equal to the inverse of the marginal cost 









ii.  Both the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal cost of utility to the 
principal are constant over time and states. 
iii.  Unemployed agents enjoy a higher period utility than those who are working. 
iv.  The additional profit from accepting the marginal job mm ( q , v ) =  must be equal to 
the reduction of expected utility it causes, valued at the price of utility:  
 
u
e u ue u u uu ue uu
P (q,v)
P( q ( 1 ) ,m ,v ) P( q ( 1 ) ,v ) ( v v )
v
∂
−δ − −δ = −
∂
 (15) 
  10v.  The continuation utility after a period of unemployment is higher if the agent stays 
unemployed:  .  ue uu vv ≤
vi.  For all q, the implied match quality threshold m is equal to or lies above the level m* 
that would maximise the expected present value of wages. 
Proof: (i), (ii), and (iv) can immediately be derived from equations (6) to (14), (iii) follows 
from (ii) with the properties of the utility function (2).  
(v)  Suppose the opposite. Then, by Lemma 2 (ii), the right hand side of equation (15) is 
negative, i.e.  e u ue u u uu P( q ( 1 ) ,m ,v ) P( q ( 1 ) ,v ) −δ < −δ . This means that the principal 
loses on a positive mass of jobs (with match quality m and above in some 
neighbourhood of m), and he could do better by raising the match threshold from m 
to m while still offering the agent   if a job of quality  ue v m[ m , m ) ∈  is offered. 
(vi)  If utility does not depend on leisure (i.e.  ue uu vv = ) or the principal need not provide 
the agent with consumption at all (i.e. 
), the insurer simply maximises the 
expected present value of wages (equivalently, output), and we have 
1e 1
ue uu v ( 1) i n f u ( , ) , v ( 1) i n f u ( ,
−− = − β⋅= − β⋅ A
u ) A
eu u e uu u u P( q ( 1 ) ,m ,v ) P( q ( 1 ) ,v ) 0 −δ − −δ =  with mm * = . 
  Now suppose that the principal chooses mm * < . If we increase m to m* while still 
promising the agent a continuation utility   if a job of quality  ue v m[ m , m * ) ∈  is 
offered, the agent’s value does not change, but the principal benefits (1) from the 
increased present value of the wages and (2) because by (2) the utility level   can be 
provided at lower cost if the agent is unemployed. Thus, 
ue v
mm * ≥  is optimal. 
□ 
These are rather standard optimality requirements, but they have some interesting 
implications. It follows from assumption (2) that agents not only enjoy a higher utility while 
unemployed, they also have a higher level of consumption. These consumption levels do not 
depend on   or m and therefore remain constant over the lifetime of an agent. This does not 
mean however that the expected lifetime utility does not depend on the individual 
employment history.  
q
 
To illustrate this point, assume that the period utility function is of the constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) variety with a coefficient of relative risk aversion  .  0 γ>
  11  11
lnc (1 )ln if 1




σ+ − σ γ = ⎧
⎪ = − ⎨
⎪ −γ ⎩
A
A A ,  , 
eu {,} ∈ AA A (0,1) σ∈   
This simplifies the analysis, because q now only affects the scale of the problem: Changing 
 by a factor   while adjusting   appropriately ( ) simply rescales all 
expected profits and consumption levels of the optimal program, leaving 
q 0 θ> v
1
ee vu ( u ( v )
−
θ =θ )
m unaffected. Thus, 
denote by   the adjusted lifetime utility for   normalised to one, and define the 
corresponding profit functions   and  .   and   can be 
shown to be bounded above and decreasing and strictly concave in  . The parameter   
simply shifts   vertically, because it only affects the income stream derived from the 
current job without having any effect beyond its duration. Also, for any 
v  q
ee P( m ,v ) P( 1 ,m ,v ) ≡   uu P( v ) P( 1 , v ) ≡   e P 
u P 
v  m
e P( m ,v )  
mm * ≥ ,   
lies above   for small  , and below it for high  . The reason is that for very low   (low 
promised utility compared to productivity), the cost of consumption to the principal hardly 
matters, but the wage income of 
e P( m ,v )  
u P( v )   v  v  v 
w qm =  per period does. Conversely, if   is very high, the 
advantage of being able to provide the agent with utility more cheaply when unemployed 
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e P( m ,v )  
u P( v )  




e P( m,v ) ′  
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  12The relationship between   and   implied by (15) is sketched for normalised values in 
Figure 1. Since 





 is constant over time and states (Proposition 1 (ii)),   and  uu P( q ( 1 ) , v ) −δ u u




 in points A and B. But by (15), this 
is also the slope of the line g connecting A and B. 




 is now bigger in absolute value, 
 must be steeper in the new tangency point of g’,  u P 
uu u uu B( v , P ( v ) ) ′ ′′ =   . Thus, for g’ to be also 
tangent to  e P( m,v ) ′   ,  e P( m,v ) ′    must lie above  e P( m ,v )   . This implies that m′ is greater than 
m. 
To put it differently, agents who have a higher productivity compared to their expected 
lifetime utility must also have a lower job match threshold, i.e. they are more likely to accept 
a job. Because the skill level of agents decreases during unemployment, this implies that an 
agent who happens to be unemployed relatively long and often during the first periods of his 
life 
-  will also have a higher probability of being unemployed in the future, because m 
increases 
-  will enjoy a higher expected lifetime utility, because both leisure and consumption are 
higher during unemployment 
-  will face a lower expected wage income growth, because longer unemployment means 
more depreciation of human capital. 
While agents with a high skill levels are particularly productive workers and therefore have 
high opportunity costs of unemployment, the comparative advantage of unskilled agents lies 
in being happy. 
The consequences of moral hazard 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the full problem, this subsection discusses the effects of 
introducing moral hazard in isolation: While there is still no problem in determining the 
productivity of an agent in period 0, the insurer cannot observe whether an agent receives and 
declines job offers that he is actually meant to accept.  
Probably the most obvious reason why the first best solution presented above is not feasible is 
the fact that under such a contract unemployed agents enjoy a higher utility than employed 
agents. This clearly induces an incentive to turn down any job offer, with the consequence 
  13  14
e
that production is zero. The only case when the first best solution can be implemented arises if 
leisure does not affect utility, i.e.  u uu ≡ . Then, the agent’s utility does not depend on his 
employment situation, and accepting the “right” jobs is a Nash equilibrium.  
In general however, an agent will only accept a job if this guarantees him a utility at least as 
high as upon refusal. Thus, the bellman equation for a period of unemployment (5) must be 
amended by an incentive compatibility constraint 
 
  . (IC)  ue uu vv ≥
 
Let   be the Lagrange multiplier of (IC). Then, of the first order and envelope conditions (6) 
to (14) derived above, only the derivatives with respect to   and   change. 
ρ






R (1 p(1 G(m))) P (q(1 ), v ) (1 p(1 G(m))) 0
v
− ∂











−δ −νβ − +ρ=
∂ ∫  (17) 
 
The resulting incentive compatible contract can be characterised as follows. 
Proposition 2: An efficient contract that solves the moral hazard problem has the following 
properties. 








 still holds. 
ii.  As long as he cannot perform a hidden action, the agent still enjoys full insurance. The 
marginal utility of consumption (and thus the marginal cost of providing utility) only 





 follows a Martingale process: 
  uu P (q,v) E P(q(1 ),m ,v,s )
vv
∂∂′ ′′ =− δ
′ ∂∂
 (18) 
  Next period’s values are marked with a prime ′. 
iii.  The condition for the choice of m simplifies to  
  eu u e uu P( q ( 1 ) ,m ,v ) P( q ( 1 ) ,v ) −δ = −δ u u . (19) 
iv.  The incentive compatibility constraint is always fulfilled with equality, i.e.  .  ue uu vv =Proof: Again, (i), (ii), and (iii) follow immediately from the first order conditions of the 
problem. To show (iv), remember that the solution of the unconstrained problem implied 
. Thus, if the first best solution is  ue uu vv ≤ ue uu vv = , this will also hold in the constrained 
optimum. If however the unconstrained solution implies  ue uu vv < , then (IC) is binding, 
, and the result is again  .  0 ρ> ue uu vv =
□ 
The resulting match threshold cannot easily be compared to the one obtained in the first best 
scenario, since the inefficiency introduced by the incentive compatibility constraint increases 


























v  v 
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e P( m ,v )  




Figure 2 shows the diagram for determining the optimal level of m as given by equation (18). 
The promised continuation utility does not depend on whether or not a job is found,  ue uu vv =  , 
and is the abscissa value of the intersection between  e P( m ,v )    and  , at point A in figure 
2. Since for all  ,   is steeper in this point than  , the 
Martingale property (19) requires that 
u P( v )  
m eu P( q ( 1 ) ,m ,v ) −δ uu P( q ( 1 ) , v ) −δ
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or, in terms of adjusted productivity adjusted utilities, 
  uu u
uu







u u . 
By the concavity of  ,    must therefore be smaller than  . But if both “utility per 
skill unit” and the skill level decline, this means that the promised lifetime utility 
unambiguously decreases after a period of unemployment. 
u P uu ue vv =  v 
To summarise, both period consumption and continuation utility are constant during periods 
of employment. Immediately after losing his job, an agent’s consumption level increases at 
the cost of a lower promised future utility. During unemployment, both consumption and 
continuation utility decline every period. Because agents are unemployed for an infinite 
number of periods with probability one, both period consumption and continuation utility 
have a tendency to decline over time. 
This result is in line with the findings of Shavell and Weiss (1979), Thomas and Worrall 
(1990), and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). All these share the common feature that under an 
optimal contract, promised utility declines after periods in which there is a moral hazard 
problem. To create the right incentives, agents must be rewarded in the case of a good 
outcome and punished otherwise. Thus, the principal must offer continuation utilities with 
different marginal utilities of consumption at different states of the nature in the following 
period, which is costly because the agent is risk averse. This cost is lower, however, if the 
expected utility offered is lower. Therefore, it pays for the principal to provide the agent with 
a slightly higher period utility and save on costs of creating incentives. 
The relationship between   and  v  m is not as clear as in the first best scenario. Depending on 
the probability distribution G, even multiple m may fulfil the first order conditions. As 
argued above, the slope of   i n    must be a weighted average of the slopes of  u P v  e P( m ,) ⋅   and 
 in  . Increasing   requires the absolute value of this weighted average to be higher. A 
higher threshold 
u P 
uu v  v 
m makes both  e P( m ,) ⋅   and   steeper at their intersection, but at the same 
time increases the weight of the flatter slope. 
u P 
For very large   however, this change of weights effect is small, thus in this case a further 
increase of promised utility results in a higher threshold level 
v 
m. Providing the agent with a 
high utility is cheaper during unemployment. 
  16If   is very low, the utility advantage of unemployment becomes small compared to the to the 
wages that can be earned. Therefore, for small  , the threshold 
v 
v  m approaches the level that 
maximises the expected discounted value of wage income, implying a shorter expected 
unemployment duration and thus a higher expected wage growth. As v declines over time, 
this case becomes more and more relevant. 

In Pavoni’s (2003b) model, agents are required to stop searching after a finite time of 
unemployment, a result owing to the a constant search cost assumed by the author. In this 
model however, there is no cost of searching but an opportunity cost of working stemming 
from a reduction of leisure. As this cost is reduced when consumption is lower, there is – at 
least with CRRA preferences and unbounded support of g – no situation in which an agent 
will ever be required to retire from work. Still, by adjusting the threshold level m for an 
acceptable job, the principal reduced the probability of finding work for very unproductive 
agents. 
4. Optimal unemployment insurance 
The mechanism just described is feasible if there is no need to discriminate between agents of 
different skill levels in the first period, when the contracts are made. Under an insurance 
scheme that guarantees to everybody the same expected lifetime utility irrespective of 
individual productivity, no agent has an incentive to misreport his skill level. Reporting a 
wrong   to the insurer in the initial period simply results in a different range of jobs that an 
agent can accept at any time. Reporting too low a skill level enables the agent to also accept 
jobs that provide a worse match than required under the contract, without earning a wage that 
lies below the minimum value expected by the insurer. Such a strategy, however, cannot 
affect the expected lifetime utility of the agent, because the continuation utility promised after 
a period of unemployment neither depends on whether or not a job is accepted, nor on the 
wage earned on a job. Thus, there is no incentive to cheat. 
q
It may however be impossible or undesirable not to differentiate among agents on the basis of 
their initial skill level. An insurer that cannot force agents into contracts might find it difficult 
to offer an insurance that guarantees the same utility to everybody who wants to participate 
while still covering its costs. 
In what follows, an incentive compatible insurance mechanism that allows to discriminate 
between agents based on their initial productivity will be discussed. Then, some basic 
properties of profit maximising insurance contracts based on this mechanism will be derived. 
  17Incorporating adverse selection 
In the initial period, the insurer as a principal is confronted with a group of heterogeneous 
individuals. The only thing known about their productivities is the unconditional statistical 
distribution. Choosing the optimal menu of contracts to be offered involves two choices. 
First, the static adverse selection problem must be solved. Since the revelation principle 
applies here, this basically amounts to offering a contracts for different levels of   that are 
compatible with truthful reporting. Secondly, the dynamic structure of the contracts must be 
chosen such that the requirements for truth-telling are met at minimal cost and that the moral 
hazard problem caused by the unobservability of the job offers is also solved efficiently. 
q
As skill levels q are private information to the agent, insurance contracts can of course only 
be based on reported values, which will be marked with a circumflex ^. Denote by  ˆˆ v(q,q q) −  
the expected lifetime utility an agent with human capital   realises when reporting  . For an 
insurance contract to locally induce truth telling, reporting 
q ˆ q
ˆ qq =  must be locally optimal for 
the agent. This requires the first order condition 
 
 
d ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ v(q,q q) v(q,q q) v(q,q q) 0











d ˆˆ v(q,q q) 0
ˆ dq
− ≤  (21) 
 
to hold for  . These conditions can be shown to imply global optimality. ˆ qq =
4, 5
v(,0) ⋅  is the expected lifetime utility a contract offers to a truth-telling agent. The shape of 
this function will be determined when solving the adverse selection problem.   is what  ˆ v(q, ) ⋅
                                                 
4 see Mirrlees (1971) 
5 I won’t have much more to say about the second order condition, except that I assume it to hold. I have not 




g( m ) g( m )




′ − ++ + ∫ ≥  
  18an agent actually gets when announcing  , depending on by how much his real skill level 
deviates from the announced value. (20) and (21) show how this function must be chosen to 







 the marginal increase of the utility promised to 













The optimal incentive compatible contract constructed in the last section yields the same 
expected utility for any level of q for a given announced level  . Therefore, implementing 
constraint (22) for any   is likely to be costly for the principal. These costs however can 
be spread over time. If   is equal to zero, the simple moral hazard case discussed above 




ˆ qq −  on 
the expected lifetime utility is automatically implemented though the incentive compatibility 
constraint, which also requires   to be independent of any decision taken by the agent. The 






κ= ≥ , i.e. agents with a higher period 0 productivity 
are promised a higher utility. It will however be seen below that  0 κ <  is also a possibility 
under some circumstances. 
To come to a recursive structure again, interpret  t κ  as the marginal punishment for lying that 
still must be implemented from period   on. To make sure that the principal not only 
threatens to make lying costly without ever attempting to punish untruthful announcements, a 
transversality condition of the kind 
t
 
  tt t lim q 0 a.s.
→∞κ =  (23) 
 
is required. 
Abusing notation a bit, I replace  (22) by the following, more intuitive formulation 
 
 
d ˆ E(v|q q)
dq
κ == , (24) 
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emphasising the interpretation of   as the marginal change of the expected utility for a given 








e e e e
   (25)  ee ee ue ee u
1
ee e e c, v , v , ,
ue f e u e u
P (q, m, v, ) max {qm c R [(1 )P (q(1 ), m, v , )
P( q ( 1 ) ( 1 ) , v , ) ] }
−
κκ κ= − + − λ + δ κ +
λ+ δ − δκ
   (PK e e ee eu s.t. v u (c ) [(1 )v v ] =+ β − λ + λ e) 
                              (PP ee e e ue u [(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ] κ=β −λ +δ κ +λ +δ −δ κ e) 
 
uu e u uu e u u
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P (q,v, ) max { c R [(1 p(1 G(m)))P (q(1 ),v , )
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−δ κ ∫
 (26) 
                         uu u u u e
m
s.t. v=u (c ) [(1 p(1 G(m)))v p v (m)dG(m)]
∞
+β − − + ∫  (PKu) 
                                                [ ) ue uu v (m) v  a.e. on  m, ≥∞  (IC(m)) 
                                        
uu u u u e
m
[(1 p(1 G(m)))(1 ) p(1 ) (m)G(m)
d ˆ E(v|q q)]
dq
∞





A few things are different from the simple first best case. First, of course,   now enters the 
equations as a new state variable. Further, both   and 
κ
ue v ue κ , i.e. next period’s states in the 
case that an unemployed worker finds a job, are allowed to depend on the match quality   of 
this job. This is necessary for an efficient implementation of the truth telling mechanism, as 
will be seen. Finally, the “planned punishment” constraints (PP
m
e) and (PPu) have been added, 
to make sure that the initially planned marginal discrimination with respect to the reported 
skill level can be enforced. That is basically done by guaranteeing that the required effect κ  
is equal to the discounted expected value of next period’s κ , adjusted by the change of  ,  qalso taking into account the discrimination effected in the current period. This is captured by 
the term 
d ˆ E(v|q q)
dq
=  in the (PPu) constraint.  
This marginal effect of the actual skill level on the continuation utility can, by Leibnitz’s rule, 
be decomposed in two effects: First, an agent with a higher   than reported can also accept 
worse jobs without earning less than the minimum wage expected by the insurer, thus 
potentially increasing the probability of employment. Second, his probability distribution over 
different wages changes. 
q
Before proceeding, 
d ˆ E(v|q q)
dq
=  must be rewritten in terms of the variables of the model. 
Using the notation of equation (26) and noting the difference between ‘effective’ values of   
and those that the principal erroneously believes to observe for 
m











ˆ E(v|q,q) (1 p(1 G(m )))v p v (m )dG(m )
ˆ qq










Differentiation of this expression with respect to  , integration by part of the resulting 
integral, and setting 
q
ˆ qq =  yields the result 
 
  uu ue
m
dp g ( m ) ˆ E(v|q q) {mg(m)v v (m)(1 )dG(m)}
dq q g(m)
∞ ′
== − + + ∫ . (27) 
 
Now it is straightforward to derive the rather long list of first order and envelope conditions 
for the Bellman equations (25) and (26). Attach the Lagrange multipliers  ,  , , and  µ ν φ ψ to 
the constraints (PKe), (PKu), (PPe), and (PPu). The constraints (IC(m)) are multiplied by 
.  (m) ρ
  
[ce]  ee 1 u( c) ′ =− µ (28) 
[cu]  uu 1 u( c) ′ =− ν  (29) 
  21[vee]  e e ee ee
ee





= µ  (30) 
[veu]  ue f e u e u
eu
P( q ( 1 ) ( 1 ) , v , )
v
∂
+δ− δ κ =
∂
µ  (31) 
[vuu]  u u uu uu
uu m
1m
P (q(1 ),v , ) {R (m)dG(m) p g(m)}
v1 p ( 1 G ( m ) )
∞ ∂
−δ κ =ν+ ρ −ψ
∂− − ∫ q
 (32) 
[vue(m)]  e u ue ue
ue
(m) 1 g (m)
P (q(1 ),m,v (m), (m)) R (1 m )
v( m ) p q g ( m )
′ ∂ρ
−δ κ =ν− −ψ +
∂
 (33) 
[ ]  ee κ e e ee ee e
ee
P( q ( 1 ) ,m ,v , ) ( 1 )
∂
+δκ = φ +
∂κ
δ  (34) 
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∂
+δ −δ κ =φ +δ −δ
∂κ
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Note that (33) and (37) each impose a continuum of constraints, one for each mm ≥ . For  an 
optimal solution, they need not hold for any  , but with probability one.  m
 
Proposition 3: An efficient contract that solves the moral hazard problem and allows for 
discrimination between agents of different productivities has the following properties. 
i.  The within-period efficiency condition 
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A ) κ  (43) 
 holds. 
ii.  Only after periods of employment, the marginal cost to the principal of providing the 
agent with the promised lifetime utility changes, but ven in this case, a Martingale 
property like (18) above still holds: 
  P(q,m,v,s, ) E P(q ,m,v,s, )
vv
∂∂ ′ ′′′′ κ =
′ ∂∂
κ  (44) 
iii.  The marginal cost of enforcing truth telling 
P ∂
∂κ









 is constant over time and states. This basically means that the 
marginal cost of inducing truthful reporting of the skill level in terms of the initial q 
does not change. 
iv.  The marginal utility of consumption is expected to increase over time. 
Proof: (i) to (iii) follow immediately from equations (28) to (42). To prove (iv), note that from 
(43) and the Martingale condition (44) it follows that 
 
11 [ u(c, )] E[ u(c, )]
cc







u(c, ) E E u(c, )









where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. By the law of iterated expectations,  
the expected value of the marginal utility of consumption increases over time.  
□ 
An interesting new aspect of this contract is the nontrivial shape of  . Two properties of 
this function are already obvious from the set-up of the problem. First,   must be above 
or equal to  , i.e. the expected utility from accepting a job must be at least as high as that 
from rejecting it to confirm to the incentive compatibility constraint (IC(m)). Second,   
must be strictly greater than   at least for some   with a positive probability mass, if 
. The reason is that otherwise the announcement of the marginal punishment for lying 
 would be carried over period by period without ever implementing it. This would violate 








  23Looking at the right hand side of equation (33), it is clear that the effect of the match quality 
 of an accepted job on the promised continuation utility is driven by two forces. The first of 


















ψ . By the envelope condition (42), ψ is the marginal effect of   on the principal’s 




ψ  is 





+  could be interpreted 
as a measure of information about the agent’s type revealed by the observation of the wage 
corresponding to  .  m
Consider the plausible case  , i.e. the principal wants to guarantee a higher lifetime utility 
to more productive agents. Since the principal’s profits are maximised at  , at least for 
values close enough to zero we have 
0 κ>
0 κ=










+ . As the marginal cost of v to the principal increases in v, this 





+  gets bigger. 
Without specifying the distribution G, not much more can be said about the shape of  .  
In the special case when G is a truncated normal, 





 is constant and consequently 





. If m is distributed log-normal, for example, 
g( m )
(1 m ) 1 ln m
g(m)
′
+= − θ  for some 
positive   and thus diverges to negative infinity for large m. The resulting   would 
monotonously increase in  , and might be equal to   for some low values (see figure 3). 
θ ue v (m)
m uu v





























Figure 3. Continuation utility profiles offered to agents depending on the match quality of the 









ue v( m ) c o n s t . =
 
The static adverse selection problem 
The mechanism just described enables the principal to offer a menu of contracts that yield a 
lifetime utility   to an agent of skill level  , where v is a continuous and almost 
everywhere continuously differentiable function.
v(q) q
6
There are many Pareto-optimal insurance schemes that offer different levels of welfare to 
different groups. Consequently, some additional assumptions are required that help determine 
the distributional outcome. 
The following analysis is based on the extreme assumption that a monopolistic insurer can 
offer contracts that are accepted by the agents whenever they yield an expected lifetime utility 
at least as high as their outside option, which will be denoted by v(q).  
After looking at this case of a ‘private’ insurance, it will briefly be discussed what changes if 
the insurance is offered in a revenue maximising way by a government that need not provide 
each agent at least with his outside option, but instead is subject to a median voter constraint. 
Finally, a few comments will be given on optimal insurance schemes offered by more 
benevolent governments that run a non-profit social insurance system and distribute the 
benefits among all agents. 
                                                 
6 This formulation allows for a countable number of kinks in v. These may distort the incentives created by the 
mechanism discussed above and can therefore lead to invalid solutions. However, it is easy to show that such 
kinks can be smoothed out at an arbitrarily low cost to the principal. In this sense, the maximum profit derived in 
this section is actually a supremum to the original problem, which may not have a maximum. 
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Before looking at the profit maximising unemployment insurance scheme, note that an agent’s 
outside option v(q) is increasing in its argument. It is also likely to inherit the concavity of 
the period utility function. As described above, q is distributed with cdf. F  in period 0. 
Assume that 
(q)







max P (q,v(q), (q)dF(q)
κ κ ∫  (45) 
                      s.t. v(q) v(q) ( q [q,q]) ≥∀ ∈ (IR) 
  
                             v( q ) ( q) ( q [ q , q ] ) ′ = κ∀ ∈  (PP) 
 
(IR) is the individual rationality constraint that makes sure an agent only accepts an insurance 
at least as good as his outside option. The set of constraints (PP) guarantees that truth telling 
is optimal for agents of each skill level. 
This implicitly assumes that it is optimal for the principal to serve every level of q, a problem 
that will be addressed below. 
The Hamiltonian corresponding to the maximisation problem (45) is 
 
  u H P (q,v(q), (q))f(q) (q) (q) (q)(v(q) v(q)) = κ+ π κ + δ− . (46) 
 




P (q,v(q), (q))f(q) (q) (q)
v(q) v(q)
∂ ∂ ′ =κ + δ
∂∂









π =  (48) 
 
Conjecturing that the individual rationality constraint (IR) is binding for the highest  , the 
following relationship can be derived from (47) and (48): 
q
 








∂κ ∂ ∫  (49) 
 
This makes clear that without a binding (IR) constraint, the slope of v is driven by the trade-
off between the cost of implementing an high increase of v in q (left hand side of (49)) and the 
cost having to provide a higher lifetime utility for all agents with a skill level below q if the 
increase of v in q is small (right hand side of (49)). These considerations are modified by a 
potentially binding (IR) constraint. 
Although the exact shape of v changes significantly with the parameters of the problem (in 
particular with the distribution F), it has some qualitative properties that do not change. 
Proposition 4: A monopolistic insurer offers contracts incentive compatible contracts to 
agents that guarantee a lifetime utility   to an agent of skill level q, such that  v(q)
i.   is monotonously increasing in q  v(q)
ii.  lies  above  v(q) v(q) for all skill levels q, i.e. all agents are insured. 
Proof: 
(i)  Assume that v is decreasing on  . Now replace the function   by 
 for  , as indicated in figure 4. By the monotonicity of 
12 [q ,q ] v(q)
2 max{v(q),v(q )} 2 qq < v, this 





minimised at  0 κ = , the principal saves on this kind of cost for all  . 
Further, as the promised lifetime utility is also lower on this interval now, the 
principal’s profit unambiguously increases. 
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  27(ii)  First notice that the principal earns money on each contract for which the (IR) 
constraint is binding. The reasoning is as follows: The principal offers an incentive 








κ , where κ  is the slope of the outside option v, 
and v(q) v(q) =  in this point  ˆ qq = . One potential contract that fulfils this requirement 
is the trivial contract where no payments between the agent and the principal are made. 
The profit earned on this contract is zero. But the contract actually offered by the 
principal is the best of all admissible contracts, and thus must yield a nonnegative 
profit. 
Allowing the principal to exclude agents from his insurance would mean to let him 
design a   that lies below  v(q) v(q) for some skill levels. Yet, the principal never 
chooses to do so, since for any interval   with  12 (q ,q ) 12 v(q) v(q) ( q (q ,q ) < ∀∈  and 
11 v ( q) v ( q) =  or  2 v(q ) v(q ) = 2 , he could earn at least as much when making the (IR) 
constraint bind on the interval. 
□ 
After describing an unemployment insurance that could be offered this way by a private, 
profit-maximising monopolist, I would like to make some brief remarks about how an 


















Figure 5. Possible contracts offered by an insurer facing a) an individual rationality constraint 











  28Consider first the case of a revenue maximising insurance implemented by a democratic 
government. To be acceptable to the majority of the voters, it must provide at least fifty 
percent of the agents with an expected lifetime utility above or equal to the autarky level. This 
means that the insurance contract described above can be altered such that the (IR) constraint 
is violated for not more than half of the population. It appears that an optimal contract under 
such a regime would most likely lower   for high levels of q, because the potential gain 
from offering them less than their relatively high outside options are large. However, it seems 






that justify a promised utility below the outside option for pretty much any skill level group. 
Figure 5 depicts possible shapes of v for the monopoly insurance and the revenue maximising 
median voter scheme. 
In reality, social security systems run by the government typically only try to cover their cost. 
But insofar as insurance enhances efficiency in an economy, there is a surplus that must be 
distributed in some way. Thus, an institution offering insurance on a non-profit basis must 
have some distributional objective. One potential objective is the maximisation of a weighted 
average of the agents’ lifetime utility. 
If equal weight is given to each skill group, an optimal insurance scheme is one that gives 
equal lifetime utility to everybody in the economy by using the contract of the simple moral 
hazard case described, if this does not violate the median voter constraint. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
A principal-agent model of unemployment insurance with moral hazard and adverse selection 
was described and some aspects of an optimal insurance mechanism were worked out. 
Although such a model can capture some interesting aspects of the problem, I would like to 
point out some obvious shortcomings that seem likely to have a strong influence on the results 
obtained.  
As the model only describes the behaviour of workers, any reaction of the demand side of the 
labour market to changes of workers’ behaviour is ignored. Modelling a two-sided search 
process might have important implications for the design of an insurance mechanism. Another 
critical assumption is the principal’s full control over agents’ wage income and consumption. 
Allowing, for example, for unobserved saving by the agent would introduce another source of 
moral hazard and is likely to render the mechanism derived ineffective. 
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Further, by the partial equilibrium nature of the model, any effects of saving on the 
equilibrium productivity are ignored. Engen and Gruber (1995) find considerable crowding-
out of unemployment insurance due to the decrease of precautionary saving. 
 
In spite of its weaknesses, the model points to some interesting aspects of efficient contracts 
that real-world insurance systems lack. As argued by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), 
unemployment insurances should create incentives not only by means of declining benefits 
during unemployment, but also through increased insurance contributions after a new job is 
found. Thereby the punishment for inappropriate actions by the agent is spread over several 
periods, which is more efficient if agents are risk-averse. However, this effect may be quite 
small in reality, because agents can self-insure against quickly declining replacement rates by 
saving. It remains to be seen if currently implemented insurance systems that do not use 
continuously declining replacement rates over time but often adopt two benefit levels (e.g. an 
unemployment insurance benefit paid for a certain time, social assistance thereafter), are 
reasonably good approximations of the optimal scheme. 
It was shown that under an optimal contract, the requirements to accept a job are less strict for 
workers who have a very low productivity compared to their promised benefit level. Such 
individuals can be provided with leisure at low opportunity costs in the form of foregone 
wage income. This implies that insurances should be relatively lenient towards workers who 
have claims to high benefits because of high past wages, but are unlikely to find a good job, 
e.g. because they have human capital specific to a declining industry. It could also be an 
argument in favour of early retirement schemes for unemployed workers.  
Although actual unemployment insurance schemes often have strong redistributional 
elements, it still seems that their design has been determined by insurance rather than 
distributional objectives. The mechanism they use to differentiate between individuals of 
different income prospects is to base both contributions and benefits on current and past wage 
income. Although an agent’s employment history is an important source of information, 
especially for young people who have not been able to demonstrate their skills, the insurance 
could be improved. It was shown that since expected future income is likely to be private 
information to each individual, an optimal insurance relies on some announced expected 
lifetime income and implements incentive mechanisms that induce truthful announcements. 
These mechanisms are based on the quality of the jobs actually held during the working life of 
a person, rewarding the employee for accepting work that corresponds to the individual skills   31
announced. Such a system could not only insure workers against the risk of losing their job, 
but also against potential income fluctuations. 
It was also shown that a monopolist insurer would offer insurance to all skill groups, 
promising higher lifetime utility to agents with higher skill levels. In this sense, there is no 
way an optimal insurance system run by the government could improve the resulting 
allocation, since it would serve the same group of agents and use the same type of incentive 
mechanism. The main difference between privately offered insurance and a public scheme 
would be that the latter could more easily implement any distributional objective. 
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